Searle and Speech Acts

Research record

Austin clarified the functional nature of language—to say is very often to do. John R. McCarthy. Serl attempts to give the project a more systematic form. His question is: What rules make linguistic action possible? When does the same sentence become a statement, order, promise, request, question or declaration? What is the relationship between speaker intent, sentence form, social traditions and institutional rules? The sentence ‘Can you close the window?’ is grammatically a question about ability, but in a general context it could be a request. Such an indirect speech act shows that linguistic meaning is not merely semantic; What the speaker wants to do, what the listener infers, and what the shared rules are—all matter. Searle attempts to classify Austen's narrative actions. Some sentences make claims about the world; Some give the listener directions to do something; Some bind speakers to future actions; expresses some mental emotions; Some institution-supported declarations change the social situation. The basic assertion of this chapter is that Serl systematizes linguistic acts as regulated social–intentional behaviors. The meaning of a sentence is not merely semantic; Narrative power, speaker intentions, social norms, and identification by the listener—these combine to form a linguistic act. Serl proposes five major types of linguistic acts: assertives—claims about the world; directive—direction to the listener to do something; committing—to bind the speaker to future action; expressive—to express emotion or mood; Declarative—change the situation within institutional rules. The purpose of this taxonomy is not to place all linguistic practices in a completely closed box, but to give analytical tools for identifying narrative power. Actual language is frequently mixed, indirect and contextual.

Structured debate

Pūrvapakṣa

The first form of the former states that the five classes of linguistic verbs are highly systematic; The actual language is mixed. Asking for forgiveness is also an expression of emotion, an act of improving relationships; Political declarations can be simultaneous claims, orders and commitments. The second precedent focuses on intention. We often understand linguistic meanings that are more socially determined than the explicit intentions of the speaker. The effect of a legal document could not depend on the private intentions of the author. The third precedent is on institutional facts. If social institutions are formed by collective acceptance, how much of the role of power inequality, constraint, history and resistance is included? Slavery, racial hierarchy or colonial law were also once institutional facts; Being ‘accepted’ is not moral legitimacy. The fourth premise is from the Indian perspective. Mimansa already analyzes the law-sentence and duty, the judgment-speaker-credibility, the scriptural declaration and ceremonial words, and the rules of scriptural debate promise–cause–answer. It would be inappropriate, then, to regard Serlock's theory as a universal starting-point.

Uttarapakṣa

Answer to the first premise—classification is not a perfectly natural race; analytical tools. Acceptance of mixed linguistic verbs would not eliminate the use of classification; It is a means of identifying major directions. Answer to the second precedent—intent is not a single criterion. Rules, social traditions and identity are also important in Sirlock's method. Parallel philosophy elaborates this point beyond institutional history and textual interpretation. Answer to the third premise—the existence of institutional facts and moral legitimacy are separate levels. ‘such and such an organization actually enforces the rules’ may be a fact; ‘Is that institution just’ a different ethical question. Dignity-based ethics critiques the second question. Answer to the fourth precedent—accept the independent history of the Indian tradition. The law-sentence of the mystic, the judicial word-proof, the ceremonial declaration, and the modern linguistic verb theory are not the same thing; But the shared problems of action, rights, duties and social consequences by language are communicable.

Parallel conclusion

Searle gives Austen's linguistic actions a more systematic form. Propositional content, narrative power, intention, rules, indirection and institutional facts form the main themes of philosophy of language. The five types of linguistic acts—representative, directive, committing, expressive, declarative—provide a useful analytical map for understanding real linguistic behavior. Indirect linguistic action shows that meaning is not just semantics; Shared contexts, intentions, social norms and audience assumptions are essential. Institutional facts make clear the power of language and collective beliefs, but not institutional survival moral legitimacy. Unjust institutions can be real, not justified.

Section index

1. Problem and scope · 5 source passages
2. Central thesis · 5 source passages
3. Major arguments · 10 source passages
4. Pūrvapakṣa · 4 source passages
5. Uttarapakṣa · 4 source passages
6. Indian philosophical dialogue · 5 source passages
7. Mithila’s parallel perspective · 7 source passages
8. Contemporary applications · 7 source passages
9. Chapter conclusion · 6 source passages
10. Chapter bibliography · 15 source passages

Cite this record

Gajendra Thakur. “Searle and Speech Acts.” Videha Digital Research Archive: Mithila–Vajji–Anga. Videha — https://www.videha.co.in/ · ISSN 2229-547X · GitHub mirror: https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/ · Digital Research Archives on GitHub: https://github.com/videha-ejournal. https://videha-ejournal.github.io/mithila-vajji-anga/records/idea/philosophy-v2-17/