The Meaning of a Word: Object, Use or Relation?

Research record

One of the oldest and most difficult questions in philosophy of language is—what do words mean? Does the word ‘tree’ mean the front tree? Any general concepts of trees? The social use of the word ‘tree’? Does ‘tree’ mean the web of relationships in which the words ‘plant’, ‘forest’, ‘fruit’, ‘wood’, ‘living’, ‘root’ etc. are connected? If meaning is only an object, how can terms like 'unicorn', 'justice', 'democracy', 'pain', 'emptiness', 'number' have meaning? If meaning is only experimentation, where is the question of misuse, false statements and relationship to the outside world? If meaning is only relation, how can the network of relations connect to the world, the speaker, and social behavior? Frege shows by the distinction between semantics and referent that two expressions referring to the same object can have a different cognitive value. Russell opens up the logical form of description. The latter Wittgenstein instructs us to see meaning in use. The modern externalist view shows that meaning would not only be locked in the brain of the speaker; The linguistic community and the actual environment also play a role. The basic assertion of this chapter is that it is difficult to reduce the meaning of words to a single element. Meaning is multilayered: sometimes objective context is necessary, sometimes cognitive representation, sometimes social usage, sometimes linguistic relations, sometimes syntactic context, sometimes community and setting. A parallel philosophy would not make this plurality an arbitrary semantics. The meaning of the word is not entirely dependent on private will; Public language, historical usage, objective references, definitions, textual contexts and evidence together form its boundaries. For this reason the formula would be—‘Meaning is not just one thing; Not just experimentation; Not just relationships. Meaning is a multilayered structure of linguistic form, social usage and relation to reality.'

Structured debate

Pūrvapakṣa

The first form of the former states that multilevel semantic models are too loose. If context, usage, relationship, community, context are all part of meaning, where is the clear principle? The second presupposition is contextual—the main function of language is to designate the world; The remaining elements are psychological or behavioral details. Adding more levels adds unnecessary complexity. The third presupposition is experimentalist—the matter of objective reference could not ultimately go beyond linguistic usage. I also talk about ‘objects’ in language-games; Therefore, experimentation is primary. The fourth antecedent is relational—the value of words is formed by distinctions within the system; Language would not find any structure from external objects alone. The fifth premise is from the Indian perspective. If one reads Nyaya, Mimansa, Bhartrihari or Apoh through the modern ‘reference/use/relation’ framework, the original Indian concepts can be forcibly adapted to modern categories.

Uttarapakṣa

The answer to the first premise—the multilevel model is division of labor, not looseness. For each claim, ask which dimension is crucial: name-reference? Sentence context? Social experiments? Class relationships? Scientific reality? This question makes the analysis more clear. Answer to the second premise—context is necessary, but the ‘meaning = object’ model would not adequately explain nonexistent terms, abstract nouns, similar contexts with distinct cognitive values ​​and linguistic acts. Answer to the third premise—experiment is fundamental to understanding meaning, but factual claims based on the meaning created by experiment can be checked by the world. Language-games would not eliminate resistance to reality. Answer to the fourth premise—relationality is powerful, but networks of relationships are used in actual practices, bodies, objects, institutions, and environments. Complete internalism can make meaning a closed system. Answer to the fifth precedent—Indian tradition should not be inserted into the modern category. First, clarify each tradition’s own position, rationale, and goal; Modern comparisons should be at the problem-dialogue level only.

Parallel conclusion

It is difficult to unilinearly reduce the meaning of words to objects, uses or relationships. Context, presentation, usage, relationships, context, community, history, and actual environment—all meaning can have a different dimension. Frege separates context and cognitive presentation; Russell opens up the logical form of superficial description; The later Wittgenstein shows the social use of meaning; Externalism adds the role of the real environment and community. Indian Nyaya, Mimansa, Bhartrihari and Buddhist Apoh present independent semantic theories. It is inappropriate to make him a prefigure of modern terms; Problem-dialogue is more fruitful. The formula of parallel philosophy—meaning is not completely closed, nor is it completely free. The public use of the word forms its limits; The world and evidence govern factual claims; History can change meaning.

Section index

1. Problem and scope · 5 source passages
2. Central thesis · 5 source passages
3. Major arguments · 12 source passages
4. Pūrvapakṣa · 5 source passages
5. Uttarapakṣa · 5 source passages
6. Indian philosophical dialogue · 5 source passages
7. Mithila’s parallel perspective · 7 source passages
8. Contemporary applications · 6 source passages
9. Chapter conclusion · 5 source passages
10. Chapter bibliography · 15 source passages

Cite this record

Gajendra Thakur. “The Meaning of a Word: Object, Use or Relation?.” Videha Digital Research Archive: Mithila–Vajji–Anga. Videha — https://www.videha.co.in/ · ISSN 2229-547X · GitHub mirror: https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/ · Digital Research Archives on GitHub: https://github.com/videha-ejournal. https://videha-ejournal.github.io/mithila-vajji-anga/records/idea/philosophy-v2-19/