Why Philosophy Changed in the Twentieth Century

Research record

The names of philosophers and the order of their works alone are not enough to understand twentieth-century philosophy. The question is, what changed so that many philosophical beliefs that were current until the end of the nineteenth century became the subject of re-examination in the twentieth century? Science became more consolidated as an independent institutional discipline; New geometry and set-theory were questioned in mathematics; Symbolic reasoning changed the boundaries of the old mode of reasoning; In physics, the theory of relativity forced a rethinking of ordinary notions of space, time, and measure; Psychoanalysis questioned the transparency of self-perception; Linguistics opened the way to view language as a system of relations, not a list of names; The World War shocked the confidence of modern progress and sanity; Colonial rule and resistance created a situation to re-examine the language of sovereignty, civility, nation, rights and history; And the modern state administration, census, law, education, records, police, military, health and statistics began to classify human life in an unprecedented way. Not all of these changes occurred for the same reasons, nor did all philosophers give the same answers. The history of twentieth-century philosophy cannot be summed up in a simple formula. However, there appears to be a common position: philosophy had to re-clarify its subjects, methods and justifications. As physics, biology, psychology, sociology, and mathematics formed their own distinct methodological and institutional fields, the question arose—what is philosophy’s own job? Does philosophy offer any particular knowledge above experience, analyze concepts of science, clear up linguistic confusion, search for the meaning of human-existence, critique power and society, or a different combination of these functions? The problem of this chapter is not to find the causes of these changes, but to understand the transformation of the problem-domain. An event in history “produced” a theory of philosophy—such mechanical causality is unacceptable. More appropriately, science, mathematics, language, psychology, war, colonialism, and new forms of state provided new pressures, new evidence, new languages, and new crises to philosophical questions. The basic assertion of this chapter is that the transformation of twentieth-century philosophy is not merely a coincidence of seven or eight distinct currents, but rather the authority of knowledge, the nature of reason, . It was a simultaneous re-examination of the transparency of the self, the role of language, the direction of history, the power of the state and claims to universality. Old questions did not disappear; His terms changed. There were already questions about God, soul, truth, causality, freedom, justice, knowledge, language and society, but in the twentieth century new science, new reason, new institutions and new political experiences changed their way of asking. Science challenged philosophy from two directions. First, science began to answer questions by its own evidence and methods that had previously been under natural philosophy. Second, revolutions within science challenged philosophical beliefs themselves. Non-Euclidean geometry and the theory of relativity presented a picture of space that differed from ordinary experience and some philosophical presuppositions. Consequently, the meaning of terms like “inevitable”, “precedential”, “natural”, and “self-evident” was re-examined. Mathematical logic changed the language of philosophical reasoning. The work of Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and later logicians showed that general grammar and logical structure are not the same thing. quantities, relations, prohibitions, existences, functions and inferences more formally can be expressed. These changes produced new ideals of clarity, formalism, and analysis in philosophy, although even the limits of these ideals were later severely criticized.

Structured debate

Pūrvapakṣa

The first premise might say that “philosophy changed in the twentieth century” is itself an exaggerated sentence. The philosophy was always changing; From Plato to Aristotle, from Buddhism to neo-judgment, from the Middle Ages to modernity—everywhere there were serious changes. It may therefore be a self-glorification of European modernity to regard the twentieth century as a special turning point. The second premise is that deducing philosophy from the changes of science poses a crisis of scientism. Einstein's theory is successful physics, but it does not automatically solve questions of morality, religion or meaning. Gödel’s theorem is a typical result of formal mathematics; It is inappropriate to make it a general slogan like “the human mind is always above the machine”. Because of Freud's historical influence, not all of his psychological claims could be considered true. The third precedent applies to political history. War, colonialism, or crises of state power affect philosophical thought, but the independent value of reason can be destroyed if thought is considered “determined” only by social circumstances. A philosophy was written in wartime—that is why it is not true or false. Fourth former Indian is from the point of view. If the changes of the twentieth century are based on science, Frege, Freud, Saussure, World War II and European imperialism, then Indian tradition will become merely a reaction to Europe. Indian philosophy's long debates on its proof-metaphysics, logic, language, soul, emptiness, karma, religion, society and liberation may be marginalized in this map. The fifth precedent is in the context of Mithila. It would be an injustice of history to measure a highly developed logical tradition like the Neo-Nyaya by the standards of modern symbolic logic. The question of the Tattvachintaman and its commentary tradition is different from the question of modern mathematical logic. Therefore, the “modernity came, the old philosophy became irrelevant” conclusion is unacceptable.

Uttarapakṣa

The answer to the first premise is that the twentieth century is being described as a period of specific problem-combinations, not a “unique” or “greatest” turning point. Philosophy changed in the post-eastern period; The twentieth century is characterized by the fact that the institutional autonomy of science, mathematical logic, the industrial war, the people state, the colonial crisis, mass communication, psychology and linguistics exert concomitant philosophical pressures in a historical horizon. The answer to the second precedent—parallel philosophy scientism rejects. The results of science have high evidential-value in areas where scientific methods are applicable; But moral justification, political legitimacy, meaning, dignity or religious claims demand a different kind of logic and evidence. Respect for science should be accompanied by an understanding of the limits of science. For this reason, “Science proved, therefore philosophy is over” and “Philosophy is independent, therefore science is irrelevant”—both extremes are unacceptable. Answer to the third premise—the historical context does not replace the philosophical argument, but clarifies its question-status. War experience would not prove “conscience is bad”; He gives reason to ask that instrumental efficiency and why moral conscience is not the same thing. Colonialism would not prove “universalism false”; He shows that universal claims can have selective application in practice, so the criterion should be more stringent. Answer to the fourth premise—It is wrong to regard Indian philosophy as a response to modern European phenomena. Questions of Indian tradition are historically independent. However, the colonial and postcolonial conditions of the twentieth century changed the study, teaching, translation, classification and public meaning of these traditions. The independent tradition dialogues with the modern context; Dialogue does not mean origin. Answer to the fifth preliminary argument—The Navya-nyaya of Mithila need not be proved to be equivalent to or a precursor to modern logic. The real question is what questions a very subtle proof-logic tradition poses to modern science, linguistics, formal logic and university philosophy. Comparing the two traditions while preserving historical differences makes the boundaries of the two traditions more apparent.

Parallel conclusion

Philosophy did not change in the twentieth century because a single philosopher discovered a new method. The change was profound, as the whole landscape of knowledge changed. Science became an institutional force separate from philosophy; Revolutions within science challenged old certainties; Mathematical reasoning changed the formal form of thought; Psychoanalysis questioned the transparency of the self; Linguistics saw meaning in mechanisms of structure and differentiation; The World War broke moral assurances of progress; Colonialism exposed the selective use of universalism; The modern state intensified knowledge-power relations through classification, records and administration. It is not appropriate to melt these into one theory. Logical directivism, phenomenalism, existentialism, structuralism, critical theory, postcolonial thought and later poststructuralism have different questions, methods and answers. The philosophical characteristic of the twentieth century is not consensus, but expansion of the problem-field. From an Indian point of view, this change means neither Western imitation nor a repetition of ancient glory. Nyaya, Mimansa, Grammar, Buddhism, Jainism, Vedanta and other traditions have independent intellectual histories; Modern science, colonialism, the nation, anti-racism, modern law and democracy bring new questions. The real task is to place these independent traditions in equal dialogue. The parallel view of Mithila draws four basic lessons from this chapter. First, the method of proof should self-review when new sources of knowledge arrive. Second—the technical discipline of tradition should not be assimilated by giving it a modern name. Third, the claims of modern institutions should be examined by the criteria of evidence and dignity. Fourth—respect for local knowledge is not a privilege free from criticism.

Section index

1. Problem and scope · 4 source passages
2. Central thesis · 6 source passages
3. Major arguments · 10 source passages
4. Pūrvapakṣa · 5 source passages
5. Uttarapakṣa · 6 source passages
6. Indian philosophical dialogue · 5 source passages
7. Mithila’s parallel perspective · 6 source passages
8. Contemporary applications · 7 source passages
9. Chapter conclusion · 5 source passages
10. Chapter bibliography · 18 source passages

Cite this record

Gajendra Thakur. “Why Philosophy Changed in the Twentieth Century.” Videha Digital Research Archive: Mithila–Vajji–Anga. Videha — https://www.videha.co.in/ · ISSN 2229-547X · GitHub mirror: https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/ · Digital Research Archives on GitHub: https://github.com/videha-ejournal. https://videha-ejournal.github.io/mithila-vajji-anga/records/idea/philosophy-v2-2/