Moore and Common Sense

Research record

One of the old powers of philosophical skepticism is that it can call into question nearly all the certainties of ordinary life. Do I really have knowledge of the external world? Do I know for certain the existence of my hands, the table, the house, other human beings or my own body? Is it not possible that my experience is the result of a deception, a dream or some widespread delusion? G.S. E. Moore adopts a distinctive philosophical strategy in the face of this crisis. He does not give the skeptic the right to assume that firm knowledge of ordinary life is automatically canceled because of philosophical principles. His insistence is—I know some general facts, such as ‘this is my hand’, ‘the earth existed even before I was born’, ‘there are other human beings’, ‘I have a body’—with more certainty than philosophical skeptical arguments. The question of this approach is not simply ‘is common sense correct’. The more profound question is: When philosophical theory and firm common sense collide, who has the burden of proof? Is common sense automatically the ultimate criterion of knowledge? Are they merely incipient beliefs, which should undergo philosophical scrutiny? The basic assertion of this chapter is that the power of Moore's philosophy lies not in its blind endorsement of 'common sense', but in its reversal of the burden of proof of philosophical argument. If a philosophical theory comes to the conclusion that ‘I do not know the existence of my own hands’, Moore asks—is that theory really more certain than this common sense? Moore would not consider common-sense to be an instinctive response devoid of reason. He considers some pre-theoretical epistemological claims so strong that philosophical theories must provide very strong evidence to succeed against them. The famous display of the external world—one hand showing ‘here is one hand’, the other hand showing ‘here is the other hand’—is a dramatization of this request. Moore's aim is not to provide a psychological solution to all skepticism, but to show that I have some direct knowledge of the existence of external objects.

Structured debate

Pūrvapakṣa

The first form of the former states that common-sense changes culturally, historically, and socially. Sometimes society considered slavery, caste hierarchy, female inequality or superstition as ‘normal’. It can be dangerous, then, to make common-sense a philosophical criterion. The other precedent is skeptical. He says—Moore assumes 'this is the hand' and admits the same thing he had to prove first. If the possibility of dreams or delusions is in question, showing hands does not solve the problem. The third presupposition says that the question of the existence of the external world is a linguistic or metaphysical one, not merely an empirical demonstration. The basis of the public identity of the ‘hand’ may itself rely on the principle of relation to the world. The fourth antecedent is in morality. The mere possibility of an ‘open question’ does not prove that ‘good’ is not essentially identical with a natural quality. Language-wise, the question may remain open, although reality-wise, there is identity.

Uttarapakṣa

Answer to the first premise—parallel philosophy does not treat common sense as the same as every belief in social tradition. Direct facts of the ‘this is the hand’ type and social ideas of the ‘such and such race is superior’ type do not belong to the same category. The philosophical value of common sense should be examined according to the type of claim. The answer to the second precedent—Moore would not have forbidden the possibility of skepticism; He brings into question the relative certainty of the evidence. If ‘this is the hand’ knowledge is stronger than the skeptical hypothesis, then direct knowledge will not be canceled on the basis of possible confusion alone. Answer to the third premise—language and metaphysics are of course important; But it would be equally excessive to regard direct experience as merely the product of theory. Public objects—knowledge, action, touch, sight, and the affirmations of other individuals—form a solid basis for relations with the world. The answer to the fourth premise—the open-question argument—was subjected to numerous subsequent criticisms. The parallel view sees this as a means of conceptual caution, not ultimate moral proof: factual properties and moral values ​​should not be assumed to be the same without additional argument.

Parallel conclusion

G.S. E. Moore's common-sense philosophy is a philosophical resistance against radical skepticism. His main force is the question—what do I know more certainly: the existence of my own hands, or philosophical arguments that say I don’t know my own hands? Evidence of the external world, common-sense certainty, and moral ‘open questions’—in all three places Moore teaches caution against conceptual excess. But common sense is not infallible. Science improves it; Social criticism challenges him; Confusion shows its limits. Therefore, parallel philosophy would not have turned Moore into blind generalism. The dialogue between judicial realism and Moore is particularly fruitful, since both acknowledge the external world and the possibility of direct knowledge. But the judgment provides a more elaborate evidentiary structure, and the Indian counterpart constantly checks this realism.

Section index

1. Problem and scope · 5 source passages
2. Central thesis · 5 source passages
3. Major arguments · 10 source passages
4. Pūrvapakṣa · 4 source passages
5. Uttarapakṣa · 4 source passages
6. Indian philosophical dialogue · 5 source passages
7. Mithila’s parallel perspective · 6 source passages
8. Contemporary applications · 6 source passages
9. Chapter conclusion · 5 source passages
10. Chapter bibliography · 14 source passages

Cite this record

Gajendra Thakur. “Moore and Common Sense.” Videha Digital Research Archive: Mithila–Vajji–Anga. Videha — https://www.videha.co.in/ · ISSN 2229-547X · GitHub mirror: https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/ · Digital Research Archives on GitHub: https://github.com/videha-ejournal. https://videha-ejournal.github.io/mithila-vajji-anga/records/idea/philosophy-v2-9/