The Problem Modern university philosophy curricula are often organised in a way that presents the history of ‘Western philosophy’ as a continuous narrative from ancient Greece to modern analytic or continental currents, while ‘Indian philosophy’ is placed in a separate section as religion, liberation, self, karma, or a list of the six systems. This arrangement creates a serious intellectual confusion—as though the general history of philosophy were the history of the West, with India as a special cultural appendix. Because of this division, the central questions of Indian philosophical traditions—pramāṇa, perception, inference, testimony, absence, meaning, sentence, universals, causality, self, non-self, liberation, duty, language, logic, debate, cognition, and reality—do not appear as shared questions of world philosophy. Instead, Indian traditions are often simply called ‘spiritual’ or ‘religious’, even though Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhist epistemology, grammar, Jain logic, Vedānta, Lokāyata, and Navya-Nyāya all contain rigorous conceptual analysis, counterpositions, discrimination concerning evidence, and philosophical disagreement. But the reverse danger also exists. If, in the name of respecting Indian philosophy, one claims that all the ideas of modern analytic philosophy, philosophy of language, structuralism, postmodernity, or philosophy of science were already present in India, history is distorted again. Genuine respect comes not from claims of priority but from serious study of independent problem- structures and arguments. The problem of this chapter is therefore twofold. First, how can Indian philosophy be read on the map of world philosophy not as a separate cultural island but as an equal intellectual tradition? Second, how can comparison be conducted so that neither the West becomes the centre nor Indian triumphalism replaces history? Central Thesis The central thesis of this chapter is that it is inappropriate to place Indian philosophy wholly within either the ‘analytic’ or the ‘continental’ category. Indian traditions possess their own independent historical questions, methods, linguistic instruments, textual traditions, and institutional lives. Yet their questions are not wholly separate from the general questions of world philosophy either. The proper place of Indian philosophy, therefore, is not found by searching for an empty box within a Western map, but by making the map itself polycentric. The history of philosophy is not a line spreading outward from one centre; it is a history of many centres, traditions, languages, śāstrārthas, and translations entering into mutual contact. On this polycentric map, Parallel Philosophy treats India not as an ‘appendix’ but as an independent party to dialogue. Nyāya– Navya-Nyāya brings subtlety concerning evidence and reasoning; Mīmāṃsā questions of language, duty, and interpretation; Buddhist philosophy critiques of self through non-self, momentariness, dependent origination, emptiness, and knowledge; Jain philosophy anekānta, naya, and conditioned assertion; Vedānta the relation among self, Brahman, and world; Lokāyata the challenge of materialism; grammar the broad problems of language, sentence, and meaning. Modern comparison with all these is possible without declaring identity. गजेन्द्र ठाकु र Table 1 — A Polycentric Map of Philosophy Nyāya–Navya-Nyāya Mīmāṃsā–Grammar Buddhist–Jain Pramāṇa • Logic • Absence • Sentence • Meaning • Duty • Non-self • Momentariness • Relation Interpretation Anekānta • Naya Parallel Dialogue Analytic Currents Continental Currents Question • Evidence • Clarity • Language • Logic • Experience • History • Power • Counterposition Knowledge Interpretation History • Language • Life Contemporary Indian Vedānta Lokāyata and Other Traditions Philosophy Self • Brahman • World • Body • Materiality • Scepticism • Democracy • Caste • Language • Liberation Critique Science • Dignity Figure 3 — A Framework for Viewing Indian Philosophy Not as a Separate Appendix but as Part of Polycentric Dialogue Principal Arguments First argument: ‘Indian philosophy’ is not itself a uniform tradition. Nyāya and Buddhist epistemology disagree over perception and inference; Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya understand the nature of verbal testimony differently; Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, and other Vedānta currents profoundly disagree concerning the relation among world, self, and Brahman; Jain anekāntavāda and Buddhist theories of emptiness differ in their aims, language, and reasoning. To call Indian philosophy ‘one spiritual outlook’ therefore destroys its argumentative diversity. Second argument: philosophy in Indian traditions is not merely religious belief. Nyāya-sūtra discussions of pramāṇa, the epistemology of Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi, Mīmāṃsā theories of sentence-meaning, the epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of the sentence, and Jain naya theory all open autonomous domains of philosophical reasoning. A religious background may be present, but it does not automatically eliminate the value of the arguments. Third argument: Western philosophy too has never been historically separate from religion. Medieval Christian, Jewish, and Islamic philosophy, modern debates about theism, and moral philosophy of religion show that the criterion ‘related to religion = not philosophy’ is itself historically false. The religious context of Indian texts therefore does not diminish their philosophical value. Fourth argument: colonial and modern academic classifications changed the way Indian philosophy was studied. English equivalents for darśana, āstika/nāstika, the six systems, religion versus philosophy, classical versus folk—such categories may be useful, but they may also oversimplify the complexity of historical sources. The Parallel method treats categories as instruments, not as the final form of truth. Fifth argument: modern rereadings of Indian philosophy are not merely acts of preserving tradition; they also create new problems. K. C. Bhattacharyya’s thought on swaraj, B. R. Ambedkar’s critiques of caste, democracy, and religion, Gandhi’s critique of civilisation, Rabindranath Tagore’s humanistic questions, B. K. Matilal’s work on logic, language, and ethics, Daya Krishna’s critique of tradition, J. N. Mohanty’s phenomenological–Indian dialogue, and Jonardon Ganeri’s polycentric conception of philosophy all make modern Indian philosophy a field of living thought. Sixth argument: searching for similarity is useful when it clarifies a problem. Navya-Nyāya and analytic philosophy both exhibit conceptual subtlety; Mīmāṃsā and modern hermeneutics both raise questions of meaning, context, and sentence; Buddhist apoha and modern theories of meaning both face problems of classification. But such similarities do not prove historical identity or influence. Seventh argument: Parallel study of Indian philosophy is most fruitful when its internal counterpositions are preserved. When reading Nyāya, Buddhist objections must remain visible; when reading Buddhism, Nyāya responses; when reading Advaita, objections from Dvaita or Viśiṣṭādvaita; when reading Mīmāṃsā, disputes concerning language. These śāstrārthas are the actual basis of philosophical life. Eighth argument: if questions of folk life, women, caste, region, language, and labour are excluded because they fall outside the standard bibliography of traditional philosophy, the modern map of Indian philosophy remains incomplete. Contemporary Parallel Philosophy must join classical texts with folk memory, social experience, linguistic conflict, law, history, and the evidential domains of modern science. Table 2 — Indian Traditions and Philosophical Fields Nyāya–Navya- Mīmāṃsā– Field of Question Buddhist–Jain Vedānta/Other Nyāya Grammar Verbal Especially Perception, Experience, Knowledge/Pramāṇa testimony, prominent inference scripture sentence Sentence- Word, relation, Mahāvākya, Language/Meaning meaning, Apoha, naya absence interpretation intention गजेन्द्र ठाकु रक समानान्तर दर्शन — खण्ड २ Nyāya–Navya- Mīmāṃsā– Field of Question Buddhist–Jain Vedānta/Other Nyāya Grammar Categories, Momentariness, Reality Domain of duty Brahman–world relations anekānta Agent, Self/Person Self Non-self/jīva Self–Brahman injunction Commentarial Debates on Doctrinal Logic/Debate Vāda, fallacies debate pramāṇa counterpositions Cessation of Liberation/Ethics Dharma/duty Nirvāṇa/mokṣa Mokṣa suffering Table 4.1 — Similarity of Questions Creates an Opportunity for Dialogue; It Does Not Prove Historical Identity Pūrvapakṣa A first pūrvapakṣa may say that making Indian philosophy an ‘equal party’ in world philosophy is a modern demand of identity politics. The criterion of philosophy is not geography or civilisation but argument; Indian texts should be studied if they offer arguments of philosophical value, not merely because of cultural pride. A second pūrvapakṣa comes from the opposite direction. It says that measuring Indian philosophy by the standards of modern world philosophy is itself colonial. Indian knowledge traditions proceed from their own spiritual, practical, and liberation-centred foundations; to read them through modern categories of logic, language, or science destroys their inner character. A third pūrvapakṣa says that comparative philosophy often produces superficial equivalences such as ‘Navya-Nyāya = analytic philosophy’, ‘Buddhist emptiness = deconstruction’, or ‘anekānta = postmodern relativism’. Such comparisons mislead readers. A fourth pūrvapakṣa notes that the classical texts of Indian philosophy are in difficult languages such as Sanskrit, Pali, and Prakrit; modern comparisons made through translation may destroy their original technical subtlety. Uttarapakṣa The response to the first pūrvapakṣa is that Parallel Philosophy does not make geography a criterion of truth. On the contrary, it applies the same standards to every tradition—argument, evidence, definition, counterposition, context, and re-examination. The importance of an Indian text does not arise merely from being ‘Indian’, but from its intellectual questions and arguments. The response to the second pūrvapakṣa is that preserving an intimate understanding of tradition is necessary, but intimacy is not exemption from criticism. The original contexts of words such as mokṣa, sādhana, dharma, śāstra, ātman, and karma must be preserved, while their philosophical claims are also examined. Reverence and criticism are not opposites when criticism is fair. The response to the third pūrvapakṣa is that simplified equivalence must indeed be rejected. The Parallel method keeps distinct such categories as ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘partial similarity’, ‘different historical function’, and ‘undetermined’. The value of comparison is not to prove precedence but to open a new angle on a problem. The response to the fourth pūrvapakṣa is that original terminology is necessary for linguistic precision. Therefore, when technical terms are rendered into Maithili, the original Sanskrit, Pali, or Prakrit term is retained in parentheses where necessary, so that neither linguistic accessibility nor the meaning of the original concept is lost. The same rule applies to modern English technical terms: the principal explanation is given in Maithili, with English used only as an auxiliary indication. Indian Dialogue The first foundation of the Indian dialogue is Nyāya–Navya-Nyāya. Distinctions among pramāṇas, perception and inference, comparison, testimony, absence, fallacy, pervasion, pakṣatā, relation, qualifierhood, and delimiterhood make philosophical analysis extraordinarily subtle. Dialogue between this tradition and modern epistemology, philosophy of language, and logic can be fruitful, but historical independence is an essential condition. Mīmāṃsā opens the relation between language and duty. How does a sentence convey meaning? How do words depend on one another? Does context change meaning? What is the purpose of a statement? How do injunction and prohibition operate? These questions can enter into direct dialogue with modern linguistic analysis, philosophy of law, hermeneutics, and moral philosophy. Buddhist traditions examine substantial selfhood, momentariness, causality, perception, concepts, and suffering. They open fields of dialogue with modern philosophy of mind, personal continuity, debates on consciousness, cognitive science, and existential philosophy. But non-self does not simply mean the modern claim that ‘the self is a social construction’; it has its own soteriological and epistemological contexts. Jain philosophy, through anekānta and naya, teaches discipline concerning the scope of claims. From what standpoint, under what condition, and in what context is a statement being called true? This question has broad modern applications in science, law, history, dispute resolution, and public debate. Vedānta gives different answers to questions of self, consciousness, world, Brahman, difference and non-difference, and liberation. It is inappropriate to reduce the tradition to ‘monism’; the mutual counterpositions of Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, and other currents must be kept in view. गजेन्द्र ठाकु र Lokāyata and materialist challenges have special importance on the map of Indian philosophy. Questions of body, senses, perception, scepticism concerning an afterlife, and criticism of religious authority show that Indian intellectual history is not merely a history of soteriological consensus. Mithila’s Parallel Perspective Mithila’s Parallel perspective plays a distinctive role in remapping Indian philosophy because Mithila has long been a confluence of Nyāya–Navya-Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, commentary, śāstrārtha, Sanskrit scholarship, and vernacular literature. The methodological strength of this tradition lies not in saying ‘we were first’ but in the practice of making questions more precise. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya’s Tattvacintāmaṇi is an outstanding example of epistemological reconstruction. But calling Gaṅgeśa a modern analytic philosopher would be a historical displacement. The proper comparison asks how the two traditions delimit obscure claims, examine structures of evidence, and receive objections from counterpositions. Mithila’s Parallel perspective gives importance to classical Sanskrit sources, but it does not prevent folk language, Maithili literature, women’s experience, caste structures, Panji traditions, social history, religious practice, and modern institutions from becoming philosophical material. Philosophy exists not only in libraries but also in conflicts of value within social life. From this perspective, rereading Indian philosophy proceeds simultaneously in two directions: vertically, towards exceptionally subtle classical concepts; horizontally, towards society, language, history, region, folk life, and modern knowledge. The distinctiveness of Parallel Philosophy lies in keeping both directions open before one another. Mithila’s method proposes four disciplines: do not distort the counterposition; state the level of evidence clearly; claim similarity only to the extent that it exists; and do not make local pride a substitute for historical evidence. These disciplines can place Indian philosophy on the global map with self-respect. Contemporary Application Today a polycentric rereading of Indian philosophy has direct educational value. In schools and universities, Indian material need not be kept in a separate cultural section; it can be integrated according to philosophical questions—Nyāya and Buddhist epistemology in chapters on knowledge; Mīmāṃsā, Bhartṛhari, and apoha in discussions of language and meaning; dharma, duty, non-violence, and dignity in ethics; self and non-self in philosophy of mind; caste, swaraj, democracy, and equality in political philosophy. In the age of artificial intelligence and digital knowledge, Nyāya discipline concerning evidence, Mīmāṃsā attention to sentence and context, Jain attention to conditions of standpoint, and Buddhist suspicion of conceptual construction can all open dialogue with modern questions. But it would be an exaggeration to call AI a ‘Navya-Nyāya machine’ or Indian philosophy ‘the first computational logic’. In law and public policy, questions of words, testimony, evidence, intention, interpretation, exceptions, conditions, and counterpositions are extremely important. The subtlety of Indian traditions of commentary, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā is worthy of comparison with modern legal reasoning. Questions of caste, gender, religion, language, and regional identity extend the modern scope of Indian philosophy. Classical sources do not provide every answer; contemporary experience, constitutions, social science, history, feminist critique, and Dalit thought are also evidential fields. Parallel Philosophy tests all these sources by the same standards—evidence, reason, dignity, and self-critique. The practical result of this method in global philosophy would be that Indian thinkers are studied not only in specialist courses on ‘Indian philosophy’ but also in discussions of general philosophical problems. Dialogue would thereby become equal—neither imitative nor competitively triumphalist. Chapter Conclusion Indian philosophy does not wait to be absorbed under one Western category on the map of world philosophy. It has its own histories, languages, questions, arguments, śāstrārthas, and aims. Yet this independence does not imply self-exile. Truth, knowledge, language, meaning, self, world, ethics, liberation, justice, and society are shared human questions. The appropriate philosophical map must therefore be polycentric. Indian traditions, analytic currents, continental currents, modern science, social theory, and local knowledges should all be brought into dialogue while preserving their respective historicities. Mithila’s Parallel tradition offers a methodological basis for this work: pūrvapakṣa, uttarapakṣa, evidence, definition, linguistic subtlety, counterargument, and re-examination. But this tradition itself is not beyond criticism. The final formula of the chapter is this: giving Indian philosophy a place in world philosophy does not mean filling an empty space on a Western map; it means making the map of world philosophy polycentric.