The Problem An old strength of philosophical scepticism is that it can call almost every certainty of ordinary life into question. Do we really have knowledge of the external world? Do we know with certainty that our hands, tables, houses, other human beings, or our own bodies exist? Might our experience be the result of deception, a dream, or some comprehensive illusion? G. E. Moore adopts a distinctive philosophical strategy in the face of this crisis. He does not grant the sceptic the authority to treat the firm knowledge of ordinary life as automatically cancelled by philosophical theory. He insists that we know certain ordinary facts—such as ‘this is my hand’, ‘the Earth existed before I was born’, ‘there are other human beings’, and ‘I have a body’— with greater certainty than we know the philosophical arguments of the sceptic. The issue in this approach is not simply that “common sense is right.” The deeper question is: when philosophical theory conflicts with firm ordinary knowledge, on whom does the burden of proof fall? Is common sense itself the final criterion of knowledge? Or is it only an initial belief that must pass through philosophical examination? Moore’s moral philosophy is also connected with this problem-structure. Can ‘good’ be completely defined in terms of a natural property—such as pleasure, satisfaction of desire, or biological benefit? His ‘open question’ argument objects to this kind of simplification. The problem of this chapter is therefore twofold: in epistemology, common sense and the reality of the external world; in ethics, conceptual irreducibility. And how are both to be brought into dialogue with Nyāya realism and its discrimination of evidence? Central Thesis The central thesis of this chapter is that the strength of Moore’s philosophy lies not in blind support for common sense, but in reversing the burden of proof in philosophical argument. If a philosophical theory reaches the conclusion that “we do not know that our own hands exist,” Moore asks whether that theory is really more certain than this ordinary knowledge. Moore does not treat common sense as an unreasoned instinctive reaction. He regards some pre-theoretical knowledge-claims as so firm that a philosophical theory must provide extremely strong evidence if it is to overturn them. The famous demonstration of the external world—showing one hand and saying ‘Here is one hand’, then showing the other and saying ‘Here is another’—is a dramatic form of this insistence. Moore’s purpose is not to provide a psychological cure for all scepticism, but to show that we possess some direct knowledge of the existence of external objects. Parallel Philosophy draws from this method the lesson that philosophical doubt is useful, but doubt itself is not a privileged truth. Ordinary experience, perception, public confirmation, and practical stability also have evidential standing. Table 11 — Scepticism, Common Sense and the Burden of Proof Perspective Principal Claim Burden of Proof Principal Risk Knowledge is almost Collapse of all Radical scepticism On ordinary belief impossible knowledge Moore’s common Some facts are Excessive reliance on On sceptical theory sense extremely certain common sense Real objects are On examination by Illusion requires Nyāya realism knowable pramāṇa explanation Avoid both blind Ordinary knowledge Parallel perspective Varies with the claim belief and blind + testing scepticism Table 9.1 — Difference in the burden of proof between common sense and scepticism. Principal Arguments First argument: some ordinary propositions may be more certain than philosophical theories. “I have a body”, “there are other human beings”, “there is a past”, and “there are physical objects outside me” are the kinds of propositions Moore treats as firm truths of common sense. Second argument: if a philosophical theory denies these propositions, the burden of proof on the theory increases. The mere fact that “illusion is possible” does not establish that every perceptual cognition is unreliable. Possibility and actual doubt are different matters. Third argument: Moore uses a perceptual demonstration as a proof of the external world. Showing a hand, he says: ‘Here is one hand’; showing the other: ‘Here is another’; therefore at least two external objects exist. The force of this proof depends on treating the knowledge ‘this is a hand’ as sufficiently certain in its own right. गजेन्द्र ठाकु रक समानान्तर दर्शन — खण्ड २ Fourth argument: this demonstration does not satisfy every demand of the sceptic. The sceptic may ask, “How do you know this is a hand?” The structure of Moore’s reply is that an indefinitely higher proof need not be demanded for every claim offered as evidence. Some knowledge can be directly more certain. Fifth argument: the philosophical role of common sense is connected with language and practice. In everyday life, categories such as “hand”, “object”, “time”, and “other person” have stable uses. Philosophical theory cannot remain completely detached from this practical world. Sixth argument: Moore’s moral philosophy contains the famous criticism called the ‘naturalistic fallacy’. His point is not that natural facts are irrelevant to ethics; rather, it is difficult to define ‘good’ as simply synonymous with any one natural property. Seventh argument: the ‘open question’ argument emphasizes this point. If one says ‘good = pleasant’, the question ‘Is what is pleasant really good?’ does not become meaningless. The question remains open; therefore the two concepts are not completely synonymous. Eighth argument: Moore’s style establishes a distinctive ideal for analytic philosophy: ordinary sentences, fine conceptual distinctions, and clear conclusions. But simple sentences do not imply simple philosophy. Behind his appeal to perception lies a serious theory about the burden of proof in knowledge. Ninth argument: Moore supports a robust realism: objects can exist independently of mind. On this point his view can enter into dialogue with Nyāya realism, although their theories of evidence, conceptions of self, and metaphysics are historically distinct. Tenth argument: common sense is not infallible. Many beliefs once regarded as common have been proved wrong in history. The best form of Moore’s method is therefore not “whatever is common is true”, but “if a philosophical theory goes against firm ordinary knowledge, it must provide strong evidence.” Pūrvapakṣa A first form of the pūrvapakṣa says that common sense varies culturally, historically and socially. Societies have at times treated slavery, caste hierarchy, gender inequality, or superstition as “normal”. Making common sense a philosophical criterion can therefore be dangerous. A second pūrvapakṣa is sceptical. It says that Moore assumes “this is a hand” in advance—the very point he was supposed to prove. If the possibility of dream or illusion is at issue, showing a hand does not solve the problem. A third pūrvapakṣa says that the question of the external world’s existence is linguistic or metaphysical, not merely a matter of empirical demonstration. The public identification of a “hand” may itself depend upon a theory of our relation to the world. A fourth pūrvapakṣa concerns ethics. The mere possibility of an “open question” does not establish that “good” is metaphysically non-identical with every natural property. A question may remain linguistically open even if there is identity at the level of reality. Uttarapakṣa Reply to the first pūrvapakṣa: Parallel Philosophy does not identify common sense with every socially inherited convention. A perceptual fact of the form “this is a hand” and a social belief of the form “such-and-such caste is superior” do not belong to the same category. The philosophical value of common sense must be tested according to the type of claim. Reply to the second pūrvapakṣa: Moore does not forbid the possibility of scepticism; he raises the question of relative certainty in evidence. If the knowledge “this is a hand” is firmer than the sceptical hypothesis, direct knowledge will not be cancelled merely on the basis of possible illusion. Reply to the third pūrvapakṣa: language and metaphysics are certainly important; but treating perceptual experience as merely the product of theory would be equally excessive. Public knowledge of objects, action, touch, sight, and confirmation by other persons provide concrete grounds for relation to the world. Reply to the fourth pūrvapakṣa: the open-question argument was later subjected to many criticisms. The parallel perspective treats it not as a final proof in ethics but as an instrument of conceptual caution: a factual property and a moral value should not be identified without additional argument. Indian Dialogue Nyāya philosophy is fundamentally realist. It accepts external objects, qualities, actions, relations, the self, and objective objects of knowledge. Perceptual cognition is ordinarily object-directed; illusion does not destroy the possibility of genuine knowledge, but instead requires analysis of pseudo-evidence or defects. Moore and Nyāya can both enter into dialogue against radical scepticism. But Nyāya does not rely on common sense alone; it offers a formal classification of the means of knowledge—perception, inference, comparison, and testimony—and analyses the causes that produce cognition. गजेन्द्र ठाकु र The Buddhist tradition presents an important counter-position to this realism. Questions of momentariness, non-self, conceptual construction, and perception place pressure on the Nyāya conception of stable objecthood. For this reason, the Indian dialogue does not end with a Moore–Nyāya equivalence. Mīmāṃsā approaches practice, language, duty, and the reliability of the ordinary world in its own way. Its tendency toward the intrinsic validity of cognition opens a dialogue with the question: why must every cognition require external validation? The lesson of the Indian dialogue is that the answer to radical scepticism is not simply “believe”, but a multilayered examination of evidence, practice, defect, counter-position, and the production of cognition. Mithila’s Parallel Perspective Mithila’s Navya-Nyāya tradition meets Moore’s common-sense philosophy at an important point: the objective direction of cognition. Statements such as “there is a pot”, “there is cloth”, and “here is a hand” ordinarily claim the existence of some object in the world; the evidential structure of such claims can be examined. But Parallel Mithila does not turn common sense into an infallible tradition. Social “common sense” can be distorted by inequalities of caste, gender, language, and religion. Perceptual knowledge of objects and social convention therefore belong to different evidential domains. An important rule of multi-evidential rationalism emerges from this chapter: firm ordinary experience has initial evidential value, but contrary evidence, illusion, social bias, or scientific findings can revise it. Mithila’s method of śāstrārtha makes Moore’s question of burden of proof clearer: the side making the more unusual claim will generally bear the heavier burden of proof. But the possibility of truth must not be eliminated merely by calling a claim “unusual”. The maxim of the parallel perspective is: respect common sense, but do not accept it blindly; give doubt a place, but not blind scepticism; treat perception as evidence, but not as exempt from examination. Table 12 — Testing Common Sense Ordinary Counter- Re- Revised Perception/Practice Claim position examination Conclusion Illusion? Dream? Add other Accept / revise / This object exists Sight • touch • use Social bias? evidence reject Figure 9.2 — A common-sense claim passes through testing in the parallel method. Contemporary Applications In the digital age, the common-sense principle “I saw it, therefore it is true” is insufficient. Synthetic images, edited video, artificial audio, and generative AI can produce perception-like experiences. A modern extension of Moore’s appeal to perception therefore requires independent source verification. On the other hand, radical scepticism of the form “everything on the internet may be fake” is equally useless. Knowledge remains possible through reliable sources, multi-source confirmation, original documents, context, and public verification. In science, common sense is often revised. The Earth appears stationary, but astronomy shows motion; time appears to flow uniformly, but modern physics presents a more complex picture. Ordinary experience is therefore a starting point, not the final science. In social justice, criticism of common sense is especially necessary. A practice regarded as normal because “our society has always been this way” does not thereby establish its moral validity. Social normality can be challenged on the basis of fact, dignity, equality, and the experience of those who suffer. In law, “ordinary understanding” can be important, but if the meaning of an ambiguous term is left only to intuition, unequal judgments can result. Text, context, purpose, precedent, and the structure of authority must also be considered. In AI decision-making, Moore’s lesson about the burden of proof is useful. If an algorithm produces an unusual conclusion contrary to ordinary experience—for example, suddenly classifying a reliable person as high risk—the system should bear a greater burden of explanation and evidence. Chapter Conclusion G. E. Moore’s philosophy of common sense is a philosophical resistance to radical scepticism. Its central force lies in the question: which do we know with greater certainty—the existence of our own hand, or a philosophical argument that says we do not know that our hand exists? In the proof of the external world, the certainty of common sense, and the ethical “open question”, Moore teaches caution against conceptual excess. But common sense is not infallible. Science corrects it; social criticism challenges it; illusion reveals its limits. Parallel Philosophy therefore does not turn Moore into an advocate of blind conventionalism. गजेन्द्र ठाकु रक समानान्तर दर्शन — खण्ड २ The dialogue between Nyāya realism and Moore is especially fruitful because both accept the possibility of an external world and perceptual knowledge. But Nyāya offers a more extensive structure of pramāṇa, and Indian counter-positions continually test this realism. The chapter’s final maxim is: what is common is not automatically true; but what is philosophical is not automatically superior to ordinary knowledge either. The broader the claim, the stricter the evidence.