The Problem Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of the sign is central to understanding the linguistic foundations of structuralism. Yet “signifier” and “signified” are often reduced to a simple formula, as though signifier = sound and signified = object. Saussure’s actual thesis is subtler: the linguistic sign is not a direct pairing of an external object with an acoustic copy, but a unified entity comprising a sound- image and a conceptual aspect. For example, the sound-structure of the Maithili word “gāch” (tree) is not directly any one tree-object; within a linguistic community it is linked with a conceptual aspect. Both signifier and signified operate within the linguistic system. A linguistic sign is therefore not merely an item in a simple list of names for objects. A second question concerns “arbitrariness.” If the signifier-signified relation is arbitrary, is language entirely voluntary? Can any word acquire any meaning at any time? Clearly not. Social convention, history, and systemic differences give stability to signifiers. Arbitrariness does not mean “individual whim”; it means the absence of natural necessity. A third question concerns linguistic value. Saussure argues that a sign’s meaning is constituted not only by positive content but also by its differences from other signs within the system. The meaning of the word “sheep” is not merely its sound-concept pairing; the differential structure of a particular language helps determine its value. The problem of this chapter is therefore: how should we understand the relations among signifier, signified, sign, arbitrariness, value, langue/parole, and synchronic/diachronic analysis? And how can a dialogue be conducted with Indian theories of language, Bhartṛhari, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Mithila’s linguistic traditions without committing the anachronism of claiming that “Bhartṛhari was already Saussure”? Central Thesis The central thesis of this chapter is that Saussure understands language as a social system of signs. The signifier is the acoustic/formal aspect; the signified is the conceptual aspect; and the sign is the unified linguistic unit formed by the two. The external object is not a direct component of this definition, although linguistic use can ultimately stand in relation to the world. The signifier-signified relation is not naturally necessary; it is socially established. Thus calling it “arbitrary” does not imply personal caprice, but indicates that there is no natural causal bond between the sound-form “gāch” and the concept of a tree. Linguistic value is differential. A sign acquires value because it occupies a position distinct from other signifiers and signifieds. Language does not simply attach labels to a ready-made list of objects; it also constitutes a system of division and classification. Table 39 — From this perspective, Parallel Philosophy accepts a relational understanding of meaning, but does not infer that the world is wholly constructed by language. Sign-systems organise meaning; factual reality offers resistance independent of linguistic arbitrariness. Saussurean term Maithili meaning Principal function Caution Signifier Sound/form aspect Expressed form of the sign Not the object itself Signified Conceptual aspect Linguistic concept Not the external object itself Sign Unified entity of the two Linguistic unit of meaning Not merely a word Arbitrariness No natural necessity Possibility of social convention Not caprice Value formed through Value Systemic meaning Not merely positive content difference/position Langue Social world of rules Shared structure Not individual speech Table 23.1 — Principal terms and limits of Saussure’s theory of the sign. Principal Arguments First argument—the linguistic sign is two-sided. Signifier and signified are not separately existing objects that are subsequently joined; in linguistic consciousness, the sign functions as the relation of these two aspects. Second argument—the signified is not the external object. The signified of “gāch” is not “this particular tree standing before us,” but the conceptual aspect within language. The question of external reference arises at a level distinct from Saussure’s basic semiological model. Third argument—arbitrariness denies a natural bond. French, Maithili, Hindi, and English can express the same or closely related concepts through different sound-forms; this variation shows that the relation between sound and concept is not naturally predetermined. Fourth argument—arbitrariness does not mean complete freedom. An individual cannot simply decide today that “gāch” means “water,” because language is a social institution. Communal history gives the signifier stability and resistance. Fifth argument—linguistic value is differential. Part of a word’s meaning depends on how a language divides its conceptual field. Different languages may organise closely related fields of experience through different lexical divisions. Sixth argument—the distinction between langue and parole separates levels of analysis. Langue is the shared social system of rules; parole is individual or particular linguistic utterance. In actual linguistics, however, their interrelation is more complex. Seventh argument—synchronic analysis examines the relations within a system at a given time; diachronic analysis examines change through time. Saussure’s structural project emphasises the relative autonomy of the first. Eighth argument—language is not a “naming list.” If the world already consisted of a completely classified inventory of objects and language merely added names, why would semantic boundaries differ so much from one language to another? The sign-system plays an active role in classifying experience. Ninth argument—the theory of differential value makes language a network of relations. Kinship terms such as “brother,” “sister,” “maternal uncle,” and “maternal aunt” are not merely references to individuals; they occupy positions within an entire relational system. Tenth argument—Saussure’s model is social, not merely mentalistic. The signifier-signified relation is established through collective convention; language is a shared institution. Eleventh argument—the signifier/signified model does not abolish every relation between discourse and the world of objects. Saussure clarifies linguistic signification and conceptual organisation; factual reference, truth, and pragmatic use require additional analysis. Twelfth argument—later developments of structuralism extend Saussure’s idea of “difference,” but it is improper to attribute the conclusions of later theorists directly to Saussure. In particular, différance, deconstruction, discourse-power, and similar concepts belong to distinct later projects. गजेन्द्र ठाकु र Pūrvapakṣa The first form of the pūrvapakṣa argues that making the signified a concept places the external world too far away. Saussure’s model does not adequately explain how language connects with real objects and facts. The second pūrvapakṣa concerns arbitrariness. Onomatopoeia, sound symbolism, morphological motivation, and historical relations show that not all signs are arbitrary to the same degree. The third pūrvapakṣa concerns the langue/parole distinction. Social rules and individual usage are not so sharply separate: speakers create new forms, alter rules, and innovation becomes part of the social system. The fourth pūrvapakṣa comes from history. Excessive emphasis on synchronic structure can obscure linguistic change, dialect, power, colonial influence, standardisation, and social conflict. The fifth pūrvapakṣa comes from comparative philosophy. It is historically misleading to declare Bhartṛhari, Mīmāṃsā, Pāṇini, or apoha to be precursors of Saussurean structuralism. Uttarapakṣa Reply to the first objection—Saussure’s aim is not a complete theory of reference. The signifier-signified model clarifies one level of the linguistic sign-system. Parallel Philosophy connects questions of external reference and truth with Frege, Nyāya, science, and evidential discipline. Reply to the second objection—arbitrariness may be a matter of degree. The basic claim is “no natural necessity”; iconicity or partial motivation reveals limits or qualifications of the principle rather than a complete refutation. Reply to the third objection—the langue/parole distinction is an analytic distinction, not an ontological wall. Actual linguistic change occurs through the combined processes of individual usage, group usage, institutions, and history. Reply to the fourth objection—synchronic and diachronic analysis should be complementary. Understand the present system, then examine its historical formation and change. Reply to the fifth objection—dialogue with Indian traditions should be limited to similarities of problem. “Is the word-meaning relation natural or social?”, “What is the unit—the sentence or the word?”, and “Does difference generate meaning?” may be shared questions; the theories are not identical. Indian Dialogue The Pāṇinian tradition displays the rule-governed generation of linguistic forms; Saussure emphasises relational value within a social sign-system. Their methods, units, purposes, and histories are different—Pāṇini was not an earlier structural linguist. Bhartṛhari brings into question the word-sentence relation, sphoṭa, and the unity of linguistic cognition. Saussure offers a two- sided conception of the sign as signifier and signified. These are not the same model; Bhartṛhari’s metaphysics of language and Saussure’s semiology are distinct projects. Nyāya connects meaning with a realist world through word-object relations, universal-individual relations, verbal testimony, and speaker reliability. Nyāya’s referential realism can provide a clear counterpoint to Saussure’s conceptual account of the signified. Mīmāṃsā places linguistic meaning within sentence-context through śabda-śakti, sentence meaning, tātparya, and ākāṅkṣā- yogyatā-sannidhi. Saussure’s langue-level structure is not a complete substitute for these more pragmatic and hermeneutic dimensions. Buddhist apoha understands classificatory meaning through exclusion of others. The problem-similarity with Saussure’s differential value is attractive, but apoha is not the same as structural difference; their philosophical foundations and aims differ. The conclusion of the Indian dialogue is that the relationality of a language-system may be a shared philosophical problem, while the solutions remain historically independent. Mithila’s Parallel Perspective Mithila’s linguistic analysis draws an important lesson from Saussure: the meaning of a word is not merely its dictionary “meaning”; one must also examine its differences within the system, its social use, and its relations to other terms. Maithili vocabularies of kinship, agriculture, ritual, folk culture, scholarship, administration, and modern digital life form semantic fields. When one term disappears or changes, the semantic map of an entire differential field may also change. In questions of standardisation, a social system such as langue can provide a useful analytic frame, but Maithili reality is polycentric: regional forms, India-Nepal contexts, scripts, migration, class, education, digital usage, and literary standards interact with one another. The parallel perspective does not allow “difference” to become a licence for saying that “truth is arbitrary.” Word-meaning may be differential within a social system; whether a particular event occurred is a factual question to be settled by evidence. In historiography, the temporal value of words must be examined. The semantic boundaries of modern terms such as “caste,” “nation,” “language,” “community,” and “śāstra” do not automatically apply to the past. Table 40 — Self-criticism: if the Saussurean model does not adequately account for living usage, social power, or external reference, expand the model; do not force local material into the theory. Sound/form Concept Combination Difference Use Test Signifier Signified Sign Systemic value Social stability Reference/history/evidence Figure 23.2 — From signifier-signified to systemic value, social use, and evidential testing. Contemporary Applications Artificial-intelligence language models learn vast structures of co-occurrence in order to estimate word meanings. In this sense, differential relations are useful; but statistical co-occurrence is not truth. A language model can learn relations among signs, while verification of facts about the external world is a separate task. In search systems and semantic embeddings, the value of words is modelled through near/far vector relations. This is not a modern equivalent of Saussurean difference, but it is a technical example of relation-based representation. Brands, logos, emoji, hashtags, and interface icons are social signifiers. Their meaning arises not merely from the form of the icon, but from collective convention and platform context. In law, the institutional value of a word can change. Terms such as “minor,” “consent,” “public,” and “property” occupy specific differential positions within the linguistic system and legal definitions; a mere dictionary equivalent is not sufficient in translation. In language policy, the category of “language” versus “dialect” is not automatically natural; socio-political classification and institutional recognition can change its value. Linguistic facts and historical evidence, however, provide critical tests of such classification. In history and literary editing, the meaning of an archaic word cannot be determined by a present-day synonym. One must examine the contemporary lexical field, manuscript context, genre, author or speaker, and comparative usage. गजेन्द्र ठाकु रक समानान्तर दर्शन — खण्ड २ Chapter Conclusion Saussure introduces a decisive relational turn in the philosophy of language. Signifier and signified together form the linguistic sign; their relation is not naturally necessary but socially established, and linguistic value arises from systemic differences. The langue/parole and synchronic/diachronic distinctions clarify levels of analysis, but in actual linguistic life their mutual interaction must be acknowledged. Saussure’s strength lies in clarifying sign-systems and differential value; his limitation lies in comparatively less attention to external reference, truth conditions, pragmatics, power, and historical conflict. Problem-oriented dialogue with the Indian traditions of Pāṇini, Bhartṛhari, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and apoha is fruitful, but it does not establish historical identity: Bhartṛhari is not Saussure; apoha is not Saussurean difference; Pāṇini is not structuralism. Parallel maxim—“The signifier is social, and meaning may be relational; but truth is not arbitrary. Language classifies experience; it does not make the world according to wish.”