The Problem The term 'postmodernity/postmodernism' is used with different meanings in philosophy, literature, art, architecture, history, sociology, media studies, and politics. For this reason, the question 'What is postmodernity?' cannot be answered with a one-line definition. A popular simplification says that postmodernity holds that there is no truth, all interpretations are equal, history is only a story, science is merely power, tradition is meaningless, and morality is arbitrary. This description erases both the diversity and the internal disagreements among postmodern thinkers. One important source of the postmodern question is scepticism toward the modern claim that reason, science, progress, the nation, development, revolution, or some single grand narrative of history can determine a universally valid direction for humanity. On the other hand, postmodern critique can itself go too far. If every grand narrative is suspect, every truth is power-relative, every identity fluid, every meaning unstable—then by what criteria are injustice, fact, rights, scientific evidence, and historical responsibility to be judged? Postmodernity is not the complete end of modernity either. Modern science, the state, the market, the university, law, rights, media, and technology coexist at the same time with postmodern culture. Thus 'modern' and 'postmodern' should be read not only as successive periods, but also as mutually tension-filled tendencies. The problem of this chapter is this: to what extent is postmodernity a philosophical position, to what extent a cultural condition, and to what extent a historical sensibility? How are the questions of grand narratives, plurality, fragmentation, media, identity, consumer culture, truth, and representation joined within this term? Central Thesis The central thesis of this chapter is that postmodernity is not a single doctrine; it is a family of diverse doubts raised against modern universality, narratives of progress, the centre, stable identity, single interpretation, and the transparency of representation. Jean-François Lyotard gives the well-known formula of the postmodern condition as 'incredulity toward metanarratives'. The question is not that every narrative is false; the question is how one great narrative claims the final legitimacy of all knowledge, history, and emancipation. Baudrillard raises questions about a world of media, signs, consumption, and simulation in which representation does not remain merely a mirror of external reality, but can itself alter the structure of experience. It is inappropriate to make Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and Baudrillard into four authors of one 'postmodern theory'. Their questions, methods, and conclusions differ; the similarity is limited to their diverse critiques of the modern centre, totality, and universal narrative. Table 77 — Parallel Philosophy takes from postmodern critique plurality, critique of the centre, sensitivity to the margins, and self-critique; but it rejects anarchy of truth, absence of evidence, and dignity-denying relativism. Postmodern question Popular over-conclusion Safe meaning Parallel limit Scepticism toward all- Grand narrative All narratives are false Examine local narratives too encompassing legitimacy Plurality All views are equal Multiple perspectives / histories Evidence is not equal Openness of meaning There is no meaning Contextual polysemy Limits of text / use Institutional conditions of Critique of power Knowledge = power Retain independent evidence knowledge Identity The person is completely fluid Identity is historical / social Dignity as a stable criterion Media Reality has ended Representation alters experience Preserve external reality Sources / chronology are History History is only narrative Writing is selective indispensable Science Science is one narrative Science is also a social institution Testing / replication Table 42.1 — Postmodern questions, over-conclusions, and the Parallel limits. Principal Arguments First argument—Postmodernity is not a simple opposition to modernity. Modernity itself contains many currents—scientific reason, capitalist development, democratic rights, the nation-state, industrialization, bureaucracy, revolutionary politics—and postmodern critique raises different questions about different currents. Second argument—A metanarrative is a narrative that gathers the diversity of history, knowledge, or society into one all- encompassing direction or formula of legitimacy. Progress, emancipation, nation, class victory, and civilizational destiny can sometimes take such a form. Third argument—Incredulity toward metanarratives does not mean the rejection of every broad theory. Broad claims about climate change, human rights, development indicators, or public health may be supported by facts or moral argument. The question concerns their scope, evidence, and revisability. Fourth argument—Postmodern plurality opens the distinction between centre and margin. Voices absent from canonical history, literature, art, or philosophy may need to be sought out; but absence does not mean automatic truth. Fifth argument—Identity need not be a fixed essence. Identities of caste, class, gender, nation, language, profession, religion, and region change through history, institutions, and practice; but the moral dignity of the person does not become greater or lesser because of these changes. Sixth argument—Media are not a neutral window onto reality. News, advertising, film, social media, interfaces, algorithmic ranking, and visual editing can change the availability and perceived importance of an event. Seventh argument—The mediation of representation does not mean the end of external reality. A photograph can be altered or manipulated; that does not automatically make the photographed event false. On the contrary, evidence such as provenance, metadata, and independent corroboration becomes even more necessary. Eighth argument—Consumer culture can generate social meaning through signs, style, brands, images, and lifestyle beyond an object's use-value. Postmodern critique questions this sign economy. Ninth argument—In architecture and art, postmodernity can break with singular purism, functionalism, or the high/low culture distinction by using citation, irony, hybridity, and pastiche. Philosophical postmodernity is not synonymous with this aesthetic meaning. Tenth argument—Historiography is selective: the historian chooses sources, questions, periods, vocabulary, and narrative form. But selectivity is not fabrication. Sources, dates, material evidence, independent corroboration, and counter-evidence constrain the narrative. गजेन्द्र ठाकु रक समानान्तर दर्शन — खण्ड २ Eleventh argument—Science is also a social institution—connected with funding, laboratories, journals, peer review, professions, patents, and state policy. But scientific facts are not merely social agreement; experiment, replication, prediction, and material resistance are distinct criteria. Twelfth argument—Postmodern scepticism makes universal claims self-reflexive and self-critical: 'To whom does my claim apply? Whose experience is being left out? Which language or category am I using? What is my authority?' This self-critique enters into dialogue with the seventh principle of Parallel Philosophy. Thirteenth argument—Excessive scepticism can itself become a new dogma. Claims such as 'all truth is power' or 'all history is narrative' can themselves take the form of universal metanarratives. Fourteenth argument—It is not necessary to conclude that postmodernity abolishes morality. Sharp criticism of local injustice, exclusion, humiliation, and silencing is possible; but Parallel Philosophy holds that the moral basis of such criticism becomes weak without universal dignity. Fifteenth argument—The Parallel maxim is: 'Perspectival truth is not arbitrary truth.' One event may be described from many perspectives; this does not make the event alter at will. Pūrvapakṣa The first form of the pūrvapakṣa is realist—postmodernity creates unnecessary scepticism; it weakens trust in truth, causation, fact, and scientific knowledge. The second pūrvapakṣa is political—without grand narratives, a shared language for collective justice, equality, human rights, climate policy, or democratic movements may become difficult. The third pūrvapakṣa is Marxist—excessive emphasis on culture, signs, and discourse can marginalize economic structure, class, labour, and material inequality. The fourth pūrvapakṣa comes from identity politics—emphasis on universal dignity can abstract away real historical oppression and group-specific injustice. The fifth pūrvapakṣa concerns comparison with India—calling anekāntavāda, śūnyatā, māyā, neti-neti, apoha, or India's plurality of philosophical traditions 'Indian postmodernism' is a historical and philosophical equation. Uttarapakṣa Reply to the first pūrvapakṣa—The use of postmodern questions is not to destroy truth, but to clarify the conditions of truth- claims more precisely. Parallel Philosophy reinstates reality, evidence, and error-correction. Reply to the second pūrvapakṣa—Shared ethical and political principles may be necessary, but they should not be turned into grand narratives immune to criticism. Dignity, rights, and justice themselves should accept review regarding application, exclusion, and institutional form. Reply to the third pūrvapakṣa—Culture, language, and media, on the one hand, and economy, labour, and materiality, on the other, are interrelated. The sign economy is not a substitute for the material economy. Reply to the fourth pūrvapakṣa—Equal dignity is not identity-blindness. Group-specific evidence, historical repair, representation, and protection may be necessary; the moral limit is that the value of the individual is not determined by identity. Reply to the fifth pūrvapakṣa—Indian doctrines should be read with their own philosophical history, aims, and arguments. Dialogue around a shared problem is possible; a claim of 'precursor' or 'same doctrine' is not. Indian Dialogue Jain anekāntavāda is a philosophical discipline of many-sided predication; it does not mean 'all perspectives are equal'. An object has many aspects, and statements can be conditional, but the realist basis is not abolished. Madhyamaka śūnyatā is a critique of fixed svabhāva, not postmodern relativism. Calling śūnyatā nihilism or postmodernism destroys both the Buddhist soteriological context and its argumentative project. Advaita's māyā and ineffability are metaphysical questions concerning the world's relation to Brahman; they are not historical precursors of a world of simulation or hyperreality. Buddhist apoha is a specific theory of word meaning; it is not synonymous with deconstruction or postmodern semantic instability. Nyāya–Navya-Nyāya provides a strong counterposition to postmodern scepticism through clarity about definition, evidence, relation, absence, inference, and objective reality. Mīmāṃsā offers a disciplined determination of meaning through text, injunction, and intention; it does not offer the unlimited openness implied by the claim that 'the reader creates meaning'. The plurality of Indian philosophy itself is evidence that 'Indian thought' is not one voice. But the claim plurality = postmodernism is historically wrong. Conclusion of the Indian dialogue—Postmodernity does not require a pre-constructed answer from Indian traditions; what is needed is comparative dialogue among independent traditions around common problems. Mithila's Parallel Perspective Mithila's Parallel Perspective takes one important lesson from postmodern scepticism—'Mithila' itself is not a single, eternal, uncontested essence. Geography, state, language, memory, manuscript, folk tradition, the Nepal–India border, migration, and modern institutions change in meaning over time. But this historical plurality does not make Mithila an 'arbitrary construction'. Places, archives, language use, political boundaries, archaeology, literature, and social memory provide different kinds of evidence. 'Mainstream versus parallel' is not itself a permanent metaphysical binary. What is marginal today can become central tomorrow; the loyalty of the Parallel Perspective is not to permanent opposition, but to truth, evidence, and dignity. The canon of Maithili literature is open to re-examination—women's, folk, regional, migrant, digital, oral, and neglected writings require rereading. But less famous does not mean greater; there should be no reverse hierarchy of that kind. A language standard is a useful functional centre; dialectal plurality and multiple forms do not destroy its existence. Standardization should be transparent, revisable, and inclusive. Parallel Philosophy rejects the grand narrative of historical pride—'our tradition already knew everything'. Achievement should be established by evidence; a modern thinker's precursor should not be invented without historical evidence. The Parallel Historical Perspective keeps four grades of conclusion—strongly supported, probable, disputed, and unknown. Postmodern scepticism does not destroy this grading; rather, it makes it more honest. Table 78 — Self-critique—'Parallel Philosophy' itself remains open to future criticism. If it becomes a new grand narrative and imprisons every thought within its seven formulas, it will violate its own seventh principle—self-critique. Grand narrative Plurality Power Media Evidence Dignity Self-critique Add omitted Examine Examine Open your own Identify the claim Test against reality Ethical limit perspectives institutions representation claim Figure 42.2 — Parallel test of postmodern questions: grand narrative → plurality → power → media → evidence → dignity → self-critique. Contemporary Applications On social media, a viral narrative can rapidly spread as if it were 'truth'. Postmodern critique examines narrative construction; the Parallel method examines source, provenance, time, independent corroboration, and manipulated media. गजेन्द्र ठाकु र Artificial-intelligence language models can generate many styles and perspectives; fluency is not truth. Multiple answers can provide epistemic diversity, but factual verification remains separately indispensable. Deepfakes can produce an experience of hyperreality—the image is present, the event is not. Here the postmodern critique of representation becomes practical; cryptographic provenance, source authentication, and forensic verification are necessary. In politics, grand narratives—the nation's golden age, inevitable progress, one cause of all problems—can provide simple mobilization. The Parallel Perspective examines historical evidence, excluded groups, causal plurality, and present consequences. In brand and influencer culture, the lifestyle image sells a sense of identity beyond an object's use-value. Analysis of consumer culture should be joined with economic value, labour chains, and environmental cost. Diversification of the university canon may be necessary; neither identity-based quotas alone nor old prestige alone is sufficient. Scholarly quality, historical correction, access, representation, and evidence should be examined together. In historiography, digital archive abundance is a new problem—more data does not mean more truth. Search algorithms, metadata quality, digitization bias, and missing archives must be examined. In public policy, saying 'evidence-based' is not enough; evidence selection, measurement categories, institutional incentives, affected populations, and uncertainty should remain transparent. Chapter Conclusion Postmodernity is not a single doctrine; it is a family of diverse critical tendencies directed at modern grand narratives, centres, stable identity, the transparency of representation, and universal legitimacy. It is inappropriate to combine Lyotard's critique of metanarratives, Baudrillard's questions of simulation and media, Derrida's deconstruction, and Foucault's power–knowledge analysis into one doctrine. Postmodernity does not necessarily proclaim the end of truth; but an excessively relativist reading can move in that direction. Parallel Philosophy restrains this excess. Plurality is important; but 'perspectival truth is not arbitrary truth.' History is selective, but not fabricated. Science is institutional, but also experiment-dependent. Identity is historical, but dignity is not arbitrary. Parallel Philosophy takes self-critique, polycentricity, and sensitivity to the margins from postmodern scepticism; at the same time, it retains criteria of reality, evidence, dignity, and error-correction. The final maxim of the chapter is: 'Question grand narratives, but do not break facts; accept plurality, but do not abandon evidence; open identity, but not the dignity of the person; examine media, but do not deny the world.'