The Problem Science is one of the most powerful knowledge-systems of modern society. Its successes are evident in medicine, engineering, astronomy, communication, agriculture, climate science, biology, and computational systems. Why, then, does postmodern or historically conscious critique raise questions about science? The question is not merely whether science is 'true or not'. The questions are: How are scientific problems selected? Which concepts and measurements are used? Which institutions control laboratories, funding, and publication? Which historical paradigm or disciplinary matrix organizes the researcher's vision? And how do scientific conclusions acquire legitimacy in society? Thomas Kuhn's history of science challenges the traditional cumulative picture. Normal science solves puzzles within a stable paradigm; crises and anomalies can at times produce scientific revolutions; a new paradigm can also alter older concepts and standards. From this historical view, a popular over-conclusion can be drawn: 'If paradigms change, there is no truth in science', or 'Scientific facts are only social consensus.' Kuhn's work does not support such simple social determinism; puzzle-solving capacity and internal scientific reasons remain important in scientific disputes. History too is a subject of postmodern critique. Historians select sources, formulate questions, determine periods, and construct narrative sequences. But this selectivity does not make the date of a document, a war, flood, death, publication, census, place, or material remain arbitrary. The problem of this chapter is: how can the social character and objectivity of science and history be understood together? What are the limits of theory-ladenness, paradigm, incommensurability, social construction, objectivity, evidence, and historical narrative? And how does Parallel Philosophy prevent postmodern critique from turning into anti-science or historical relativism? Central Thesis The central thesis of this chapter is that science is both a social institution and a distinctive method for testing reality. Its social history does not make scientific facts arbitrary; nor does its methodological power exempt it from social criticism. Scientific objectivity is not a view from nowhere in which there is 'no human being or institution'; it is built through systematic processes that reduce error—replication, measurement, criticism, openness, counter-evidence, statistical discipline, instrumental testing, independent research, and revision. History is evidence-based reconstruction. Sources can be incomplete or selected, and historians can be question-relative; yet chronology, provenance, material evidence, textual criticism, independent corroboration, and counter-evidence constrain conclusions. Kuhn's paradigms illuminate the historical structure of science; Foucault's archaeology and genealogy examine conditions of possibility and power-relations of knowledge; science studies examine institutions, laboratories, and communities. None of these three entails the conclusion that 'evidence is irrelevant'. Table 85 — Parallel maxim—'Write the history of science, but do not dissolve science into history; examine institutions, but do not abandon experiment; see the paradigm, and also see the resistance of reality; read the narrative of history, but retain the limits imposed by sources.' Critical question Valid lesson Wrong over-conclusion Parallel criterion Paradigm Problems/standards are historical All truths change Paradigm + evidence Observation is conceptually Theory-laden observation Everything seen is illusion Instruments/replication structured Incommensurability Comparison can be difficult Comparison is impossible Translation + performance Social institution Interests/funding have effects Science = power Independent testing Objectivity Procedural achievement Complete neutrality Error-correction Historical selection Questions/sources are selected History = story Sources/chronology Scientific change Revolution/crisis is possible There is no progress Problem-solving Plurality Methods are field-relative All methods are equal Claim-appropriate criteria Table 46.1 — Critique of science/history: lessons, over-conclusions, and Parallel limits. Principal Arguments First argument—Kuhn's normal science is the activity of puzzle-solving within a paradigm. A paradigm supplies a framework of problems, exemplary cases, instruments, standards, and acceptable solutions. Second argument—The historicity of paradigms does not make science arbitrary. A paradigm can become surrounded by anomalies; a new theory can solve more problems, make more accurate predictions, explain new phenomena, or open new research. Third argument—Theory-ladenness says that observation is not a 'raw fact' without concepts or background theory. But instrument calibration, blind analysis, independent experiments, and cross-method convergence can reduce personal and theoretical bias. Fourth argument—Incommensurability does not mean total impossibility of comparison. Kuhn's view became more nuanced over time; different scientific frameworks can create conceptual and normative difficulties, yet scientific comparison and change actually occur. Fifth argument—Social studies of science rightly show that laboratories, instruments, funding, prestige, journals, patents, the state, industry, war, and education affect the history of scientific production. Sixth argument—But from 'there are social causes' it does not follow that 'facts are only social constructions'. Which institution purchased an instrument is a social fact; the reliability of the physical result measured by the instrument is to be tested by calibration, replication, and independent comparison. Seventh argument—Objectivity is not merely the absence of individual bias. Social epistemology such as that of Helen Longino emphasizes the importance of critical communities, public standards, diverse viewpoints, and responses to objections. Parallel Philosophy joins this procedural objectivity with multi-evidential rationalism. Eighth argument—Popper's falsifiability stresses the critical character of science; Kuhn offers a more complex picture of actual scientific communities and history. It is inappropriate to turn the two into simple enemies. Ninth argument—Feyerabend raises sharp questions about methodological pluralism; reducing 'anything goes' to a simple slogan for scientific anarchy diminishes his historical and critical project. Tenth argument—Science studies, including science and technology studies, examine the roles of laboratories, objects, networks, and standardization. These studies make the social complexity of scientific practice clearer; they do not make facts automatically false. Eleventh argument—Historians' selection is unavoidable. From millions of sources, material relevant to a question will be chosen; but selection criteria, source criticism, counter-evidence, and chronological fit can be made public. गजेन्द्र ठाकु रक समानान्तर दर्शन — खण्ड २ Twelfth argument—The narrative form of history helps us understand relations among events, but narrative skill does not replace evidence. A beautiful narrative does not make a false chronology or fabricated quotation true. Thirteenth argument—Both science and history contain archive and survival bias. Experiments that are published, documents that survive, languages that are digitized, and materials institutions preserve become more visible. Invisibility does not automatically prove the opposite truth. Fourteenth argument—Scientific and historical objectivity can be understood as comparative error reduction: better measurement, more sources, better controls, open criticism, more independent corroboration, and fewer undisclosed interests increase confidence. Fifteenth argument—The Parallel method gives a joint sequence for science and history: clarify the question → identify the method/paradigm → examine sources/data → state institutional interests → seek counter-evidence → conduct independent re- examination → state the confidence level of the conclusion. Pūrvapakṣa The first form of the pūrvapakṣa is scientific realist—too much emphasis on history and society underestimates the objective achievements of science; electrons, viruses, planets, genes, and tectonic plates are not social stories. The second pūrvapakṣa is social constructionist—scientific facts are not available without laboratories, instruments, institutions, language, and consensus; the language of 'objective reality' conceals this constructed condition. The third pūrvapakṣa is historical-relativist—historians construct narratives; different narratives are possible from the same sources; therefore one final history is impossible. The fourth pūrvapakṣa is political—there are histories of colonialism, racial classification, gender bias, environmental harm, and war technology carried out in the name of science; science cannot be granted moral neutrality. The fifth pūrvapakṣa comes from Indian comparison—directly imposing the modern category 'science' upon Nyāya theories of evidence, Ayurveda, jyotiṣa/astronomy, mathematics, classical medicine, or logic can be an anachronism. Uttarapakṣa Reply to the first pūrvapakṣa—Physical entities and objects can be real; scientific concepts and measurements can change historically. Realism and historical epistemology are not mutually contradictory. Reply to the second pūrvapakṣa—Knowledge-structures can be social, while external resistance can also be real. Different laboratories can obtain the same result, new technologies can make successful predictions, and pathogens can respond to interventions—these provide constraint beyond social consensus. Reply to the third pūrvapakṣa—The absence of a final history does not mean there is no historical truth. Interpretation can change with new sources, while evidential limits concerning dates, events, and documents remain. Reply to the fourth pūrvapakṣa—Science is not a morally neutral institution. Research purposes, consent, harm, distribution, military use, environment, and access raise questions of justice and dignity; but ethical misuse does not automatically refute a scientific fact. Reply to the fifth pūrvapakṣa—Indian knowledge traditions should be read through their own historical terms, standards, and purposes. Comparison with modern science should take the form of problem-dialogue; the claim that 'ancient science already had modern X' requires direct historical evidence. Indian Dialogue Nyāya philosophy analyzes pramāṇa, doubt, error, inference, vyāpti, and object-related cognition. It is not the same as modern experimental science, but a strong philosophical dialogue concerning evidence and justification is possible. Navya-Nyāya clarifies claims, relations, delimitation, and absences; problem-dialogue with scientific operational definitions, measurement relations, or causal claims can be fruitful, but this is not historical identity. Buddhist pramāṇa traditions examine the limits of perception and concept, inference, exclusion, and cognition. Calling them a precursor of theory-ladenness would be inappropriate; they should be treated as an independent Indian debate concerning the mediation of knowledge. The historical medical tradition of Ayurveda is important; claims of modern clinical efficacy require separate modern tests of safety, experiment, and statistics. Historical prestige is not evidence of modern efficacy. The achievements of Indian mathematical and astronomical traditions should be established through original texts, dates, calculations, and transmission—not through nationalist precursorism. Mīmāṃsā raises a distinctive problem concerning the validity of śāstra and sentence; it is not synonymous with scientific observation or experiment. Yet the question 'Under what conditions does a statement give knowledge?' is a shared point of dialogue. Jain anekāntavāda provides a multi-perspectival discipline; it is neither scientific pluralism nor postmodern relativism. Different models can be useful, but their predictive and explanatory performance should be tested. Conclusion of the Indian dialogue—Uniform categories such as 'Indian science' or 'Western science' should be used cautiously; actual texts, methods, institutions, periods, and results should be examined separately. Mithila's Parallel Perspective The study of Mithila's history and knowledge requires a combined discipline of science and history—archaeology, geography, river and flood data, agricultural studies, census data, manuscripts, linguistics, oral history, and social archives can complement one another. The history of floods is neither merely the hydrology of rivers nor merely folk memory. Rainfall, river discharge, embankment records, settlement maps, crop loss, migration, oral testimony, and policy archives should be brought together. Pañjī and Śākhā-pustaka are historical sources; they are not automatically the whole reality of biological genealogy or social categories. Examine document provenance, dating, interpolation, copying tradition, and external corroboration. In Maithili linguistics, corpus frequency is useful; also examine whether the corpus itself is representative—which period, genre, region, script, gender/social group, and level of digital availability does it include? For archaeological or site claims in Mithila, local memory is an important clue, but excavation, stratigraphy, inscriptions, material dating, and comparative archaeology provide distinct evidence. The Parallel historical perspective neither rejects science as an 'external modern criterion' nor erases local and oral sources in the name of science. It assigns evidential weight according to the type of claim. Claims of glory—'Mithila had already discovered modern science or philosophy'—should not be made without evidence of historical influence or identity. The same problem can have arisen independently; modern categories should not be projected retrospectively. Table 86 — Main maxim—'Mithila's sources are plural; criteria are plural, not arbitrary. Bring together scientific measurement and people's experience; state the limits of both.' Counter- Question Paradigm Evidence Institution Re-examination Conclusion evidence Independent Clarify the claim Standards/concepts Data/sources Interests/funding Alternative tests Confidence level corroboration गजेन्द्र ठाकु र Figure 46.2 — Parallel examination of science/history: Question → Paradigm → Evidence → Institution → Counter-Evidence → Re-examination → Confidence Level Contemporary Applications In AI research, benchmark performance can be a scientific achievement; but benchmark selection, data contamination, hidden test leakage, compute advantage, reproducibility, and real-world generalization should be examined. In medicine, a randomized controlled trial can provide strong evidence; external validity, adverse effects, subgroup variation, publication bias, and real-world evidence are also important. In climate science, model plurality can reflect uncertainty and complexity; multiple models do not make climate change arbitrary. Examine convergence, observation, mechanism, and uncertainty intervals. In history, digitized corpora expand research; OCR errors, digitization selection, metadata gaps, and bias toward digitized rather than non-digitized archives can also arise. In public policy, evidence-based policy should make measurement definitions, causal identification, distributional effects, local context, and ethical constraints explicit. University research metrics such as citation counts and impact factors can measure productive output; methodological quality, replication, negative results, local-language scholarship, and long-term archival value are distinct matters. In science communication, concealing uncertainty can weaken trust; stating uncertainty does not mean 'science is weak', but is an honest presentation of confidence levels. In historical communication, documentaries, museums, textbooks, and AI summaries construct narratives; keeping citations and provenance visible clarifies the distinction between narrative and source. Chapter Conclusion Science is both a social institution and a powerful method for testing reality. It is wrong to set these two levels against one another. Kuhn shows historical paradigms and revolutions in science; his view does not abolish scientific progress or internal scientific reasons. Theory-laden observation, incommensurability, funding, prestige, social values, and archival selection make objectivity difficult, not impossible. History is selective reconstruction; narrative form can be necessary, but chronology, provenance, material evidence, and independent corroboration constrain the narrative. Postmodern critique can make science and history more self-critical; excessive relativism destroys their evidential value. Parallel Philosophy accepts the first lesson and rejects the second excess. The final maxim of the chapter is: 'Examine the institutions of science, preserve experiment; examine the narratives of history, preserve sources; identify paradigms, do not deny the resistance of reality; accept revision, not arbitrariness.'